Selecting Against Difference: Assisted Reproduction, Disability and Regulation by Holland, Suzanne
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 30 | Issue 2 Article 10
2003
Selecting Against Difference: Assisted
Reproduction, Disability and Regulation
Suzanne Holland
sh@sh.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Suzanne Holland, Selecting Against Difference: Assisted Reproduction, Disability and Regulation, 30 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. (2014) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol30/iss2/10





SELECTING AGAINST DIFFERENCE:  


































Recommended citation: Suzanne Holland, Selecting Against Difference: Assisted 
Reproduction, Disability and Regulation, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 401 (2003).  
401 
SELECTING AGAINST DIFFERENCE: ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTION, DISABILITY AND REGULATION 
SUZANNE HOLLAND* 
 I. THE “PROBLEM” AT HAND....................................................................................  401 
 II. THE ASSISTED REPRODUCTION TECHNOLOGIES INDUSTRY (ARTS) ...................  403 
 III. HUMAN FLOURISHING, DISABILITY AND REGULATION .......................................  405 
 IV. PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES ............................................................................  407 
 V. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................  409 
I.   THE “PROBLEM” AT HAND 
 In 1993, Martha Field suggested a standard for parental discre-
tion in cases of abortion and in cases concerning what she referred to 
as “handicapped” newborns.1 She argued against parental discretion 
to control the fate of a handicapped newborn when that fate involves 
ending the newborn’s life. Similarly, on the grounds of equal protec-
tion from discrimination, Field insisted “that whatever the moment 
at which a right to life begins for children who do not have handicap, 
the same stage of development defines the right to life of children 
who do have handicap . . . [and that] [t]his antidiscrimination ap-
proach applies not only after birth, but even before.”2 In other words, 
on the basis of equal protection from discrimination, we ought not 
kill newborns with handicaps; nor should we deprive them of the 
right to be born, whenever that right obtains to other fetuses. 
 Professor Field’s provocative analysis opens a window into a ques-
tion that we have more reason to be concerned about than we did 
nine years ago when her article appeared: the issue of prenatal test-
ing for genetic selection and identification. What of the pre-
implantation embryo that is found to be “defective”? What consti-
tutes an identifiable “defect” in the realm of prenatal diagnosis that 
could subsequently result in a handicapped newborn? The answer is 
rather straightforward in one sense: some chromosomal mutations 
are readily identifiable and are clearly linked to genetic conditions 
such as trisomy, hemophilia, Cystic Fibrosis, Tay-Sachs disease, 
Huntington’s disease, and others. Some forms of deafness, blindness, 
intersexuality, and other conditions less readily identifiable by the 
                                                                                                                    
 * Associate Professor of Religious & Social Ethics and Chair of the Department of 
Religion at University of Puget Sound in Tacoma, Washington.  This Article was originally 
presented at the Florida State University College of Law Conference on Genetics and Dis-
ability in March, 2002, and was intended to be a response to Professor Martha Field. I 
thank my hosts at Florida State for the opportunity to write on such an important issue. 
 1. Martha A. Field, Killing “the Handicapped”—Before and After Birth, 16 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 79 (1993). Recognizing that disability is a preferred term for persons with 
impairments, Field uses the term “handicapped” in part because it is the case that “in the 
newborn context the more degrading term is the norm.” Id. at 79 n.1. 
 2. Id. at 132. 
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term “disease” are also genetically linked. Prenatal genetic testing 
for single gene traits makes it possible to abort “defective” fetuses, 
but today, technology has the potential to increase the options for 
eugenic selection by parents. Termination of pregnancy is not the 
sole option. It is also possible, prenatally, to select out for certain un-
desirable traits and conditions, even as it will be increasingly possi-
ble to perform types of genetic engineering that would alter the ge-
netic composition of the pre-implantation embryo, or the fetus. 
 Although it may border on stating the obvious, I want to suggest 
that eugenic practices are widespread in our culture. Earlier this 
year, for example, we had the news that prenatal genetic diagnosis 
(PGD) was used to select an embryo without the gene for early onset 
Alzheimer’s, resulting in a disease-free baby born to a woman who 
has a gene for a specific form of Alzheimer’s, thus sparing the baby 
the fate of the mother.3 Similarly, Britain’s Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (HFEA) found itself considering whether to al-
low parental use of PGD in order to select out a pre-implantation 
embryo free of thalassaemia, a rare genetic blood disorder fatal in 
children.4 I will not elaborate upon the ethical issues accompanying 
each of these cases, but it is important to be clear that each time we 
make use of genetic technologies to accomplish desired genetic ends, 
we are practicing eugenics, for good or for ill. We have already heard 
much about such issues in this conference, but my aim in these re-
marks is to pose some questions and challenges to the regulatory 
framework surrounding the primary site of eugenic practices, the as-
sisted reproduction industry. I do so not from the perspective of the 
law, since that is not my discipline, but from the perspective of eth-
ics. 
 In the interest of disclosure, I feel I should say that, on one hand, 
I do not think of myself as having any first-hand experience with dis-
ability, and so I feel that my remarks lack the kind of authenticity of 
one who has lived with impairment on an intimate and daily level. 
And on the other hand, there is something distinctive about my oth-
erwise quite privileged life that does guide much of my thinking on 
this issue of genetics and disability, and that is that I live my life as 
a homosexual person in a deeply heteronormative culture. The life 
that is open to me to live is therefore constrained in some very real 
ways by virtue of the fact that I have what I think can be rightly 
called something of a social handicap, though it is certainly not a 
disability in any legal sense. 
                                                                                                                    
 3. Denise Grady, Baby Spared Mother’s Fate by Genetic Tests as Embryo, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at A-16. 
 4. BBC News, ‘Designer’ Baby Decision Due (Feb. 22, 2002), available at http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/hi/english/health/newsid_1833000/1833990.stm (last visited January 29, 2003) 
(on file with author). 
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 Not surprisingly then, I am particularly interested in some of the 
murkier cases of eugenic intervention—by murky I mean the so-
called behavioral conditions that are found to have genetic linkages, 
such as intelligence, alcoholism, aggression, homosexuality, and so 
on. Persons having these traits are not generally considered to be 
disabled and do not fall under the protection of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.5 However, such persons might reasonably be viewed 
as having impairments that affect one’s emotional and social life 
perhaps more than one’s physical well being; although the latter can 
certainly be affected as well. Being a homosexual male in a hetero-
sexual male culture, for example, often imperils one’s bodily integrity 
and safety. Here is an instance where the social construction of dis-
ability appears brightlined: the “problem” with being homosexual is 
not the fact of one’s basic sexual orientation; it is the problem of a 
previously established social norm against which the homosexual 
appears to be abnormal, or otherwise defective. The problem is simi-
lar for differently-abled persons, as well: society construes their dif-
ference to mean less than normal, less than desirable. That differ-
ence matters is a sign of its social construction, as Adrienne Asch has 
long pointed out.6 
 Thus, I proceed to a brief overview of the assisted reproductive 
technologies (ARTs) sector. Following this, I look at the issue of hu-
man flourishing—what is required for a good life in the Aristotelian 
sense. With this view in mind, I next consider the problems and pos-
sibilities of genetic intervention in assisted reproduction, and exam-
ine some of the issues of regulation7 brought about by ARTs and 
eugenics. 
II.   THE ASSISTED REPRODUCTION TECHNOLOGIES INDUSTRY (ARTS)8 
 The assisted reproduction services sector is one of the fastest 
                                                                                                                    
 5. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (2000) (characterizing homo-
sexuality and bisexuality as insufficient impairments to classify as disabilities under this 
chapter). 
 6. See Adrienne Asch, Disability Equality and Prenatal Testing: Contradictory or 
Compatible?, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 315 (2003). See also Adrienne Asch, Prenatal Diagno-
sis and Selective Abortion: A Challenge to Practice and Policy, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1649 
(1999). 
 7. In using the term “regulation” throughout this Article, I do not necessarily mean 
legal regulation, although I do not rule it out. I do favor, however, robust and binding 
guidelines, or Codes of Ethics, that specify the ethical content of eugenic intervention in 
prenatal testing and genetic selection in the ARTs sector. 
 8. Mary Mahowald prefers the acronym MART (Medically Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies) instead of ARTs because MART indicates the use of technologies that depend 
on medical assistance, versus some forms of ARTs, as Mahowald notes, that “can be ac-
complished without medical assistance.” Mary B. Mahowald, Medically Assisted Reproduc-
tive Technology: Variables, Verities, and Rules of Thumb, 6 ASSISTED REPROD. REVS. 175, 
175 (1991). In this Article I am exclusively using ARTs in the former sense.   
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growing industries related to advances in genetics. Over the last ten 
years, the industry has grown so voraciously that estimates of its 
growth are represented by some 300-plus clinics, for a combined 
value exceeding two billion dollars per year.9 None of this is regu-
lated by the federal government, although some piecemeal state 
regulations do exist.10 What began as a rather benign effort twenty-
plus years ago to help infertile couples conceive has today become a 
vast industry offering a dizzying array of services to make conception 
not simply possible, but highly selective. In a society that prizes free-
dom of choice, it is hard to see, prima facie, what could be wrong with 
such a scenario. 
 The question arises, however, whether freedom of choice ought to 
be unbounded. That is to say, should the fertility industry remain an 
unregulated oasis of genetic choice for anyone who can afford its of-
ferings, or should we seek somehow to draw boundaries around the 
eugenic selections it makes possible, and if so, on what basis? And 
whose values will determine those boundaries? Of course we will get 
a very different answer to the question if we proceed from the van-
tage point of those with handicap or disability. 
 I propose, against Robertson and others,11 that reproduction is a 
bounded right. Because it is both personal and social, it has corre-
sponding social obligations.12 One of those obligations, the one I wish 
to examine here, is to vulnerable populations. By this I mean to sug-
gest that among the ethical imperatives of society is support of and 
advocacy for its most vulnerable members. Such an obligation must 
begin by listening to these members of society and acknowledging 
their epistemological privilege—that such persons have a valuable 
standpoint on knowledge gathered by virtue of their lived experi-
ences, and that they ought to be involved in the decisions and policies 
that most affect their lives, as Field has suggested.13 This social obli-
gation, I believe, extends to regulatory guidelines for the allowable 
uses of assisted reproduction with respect to vulnerable population 
groups. Those who have reason to fear that, had the technology been 
possible earlier, they might not have been born, or might not have 
                                                                                                                    
 9. Michael Selz, Birth Business: Industry Races to Aid Infertile, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 
1997, at B-1. 
 10. See generally LORI ANDREWS & DOROTHY NELKIN, BODY BAZAAR: THE MARKET 
FOR HUMAN TISSUE IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY AGE (2001). 
 11. See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994). For opposing views on this subject, see Cynthia B. 
Cohen, Selling Bits and Pieces of Humans to Make Babies: The Gift of the Magi Revisited, 
24 J. MED. & PHIL. 288 (1999). See also MAURA A. RYAN, ETHICS AND ECONOMICS OF 
ASSISTED REPRODUCTION: THE COST OF LONGING 43-62 (2001). 
 12. See Bonnie Steinbock, Sex Selection: Not Obviously Wrong, HASTINGS CENTER RE-
P., Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 23. 
 13. Field, supra note 1, at 115-24. 
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been selected with the particular genetic configuration that they now 
possess—these are the persons whose epistemological standpoint 
must be sought. These are the persons who must be given voice in 
any discussion of industry regulations or guidelines. Justice demands 
this of us. 
 Indeed, the case can be made that the increasing reliance on re-
productive technologies to select genetically desirable children on the 
part of those who can afford those technologies raises several justice 
questions.14 One such question is that of fairness in distribution of 
benefits and burdens of these unregulated technologies. Another 
question has been raised by Professor Field—that of justice as equal 
protection and freedom from discrimination for handicapped new-
borns.15 Similarly, Dorothy Roberts raises issues of racial justice in 
critiquing the reliance on reproductive technologies to strengthen the 
genetic ties of the white dominant culture.16 I wish to bring a focus on 
justice into deliberations on the fertility industry, vis-à-vis the role it 
plays in eugenic selection for the elimination of disability and differ-
ence. It is a matter of justice to suggest that human beings ought not 
to be constrained unduly, but allowed to reach their full capacities, 
as Martha Nussbaum tells us.17 
III.   HUMAN FLOURISHING, DISABILITY AND REGULATION 
 In Women and Human Development, Nussbaum outlines what she 
calls “central human functional capabilities,” by which she means to 
suggest that there are basic capacities common to all human beings 
across all cultures.18 Nussbaum argues that a good society is one that 
supports a minimal threshold by which its citizens can realize ten 
central capabilities.19 She does not consider whether her claim of ba-
sic capacities inherent in being human also holds for disabled citi-
zens in society (other than economically and gender disadvantaged 
persons), but I think it might be useful to open the issue here, and to 
try and extend the capabilities to our topic. 
 I will not enumerate all ten capabilities, though I wish to elabo-
rate upon a few that seem to me to be fruitful for my exploration. 
Nussbaum claims that among the central human functional capaci-
ties are these six: life, bodily health, bodily integrity, practical rea-
son, affiliation, and control over one’s environment, both political and 
                                                                                                                    
 14. I do not propose to answer all of these questions, or to advance any theory of jus-
tice pertaining to disability rights, although this is surely a paper in need of an author. 
 15. Field, supra note 1, at 96-105. 
 16. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209 (1995). 
 17. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 75-80 (2000). 
 18. Id. at 78. 
 19. Id. at 75. 
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material.20 To parse these more fully, Nussbaum offers the following 
content: “Life,” she describes as, “[b]eing able to live to the end of a 
human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one’s 
life is so reduced as to be not worth living.”21 “Bodily Health,” she de-
fines as, “[b]eing able to have good health, including reproductive 
health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.”22 
“Practical Reason” means, among other things, the ability “to form a 
conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the 
planning of one’s life.”23 Finally, “Control over One’s Environment” 
specifies both political and material content, though it is the material 
content that interests me here.24 Nussbaum writes that material con-
trol over one’s environment means “[b]eing able to hold property . . . 
in terms of real opportunity; and having property rights on an equal 
basis with others; having the right to seek employment on an equal 
basis with others.”25 When Field suggests, for example, that the right 
to live in community is a fundamental right for human flourishing of 
some persons with disabilities,26 this would seem to cohere with 
Nussbaum’s capacity for control over one’s environment. 
 It seems to me that the content specified by Nussbaum’s capabili-
ties list is relevant to the issue of genetics, disability, and govern-
ment regulation. I imagine we would like to insist that all persons 
living with disabilities deserve access to, for example, “Life” as Nuss-
baum defines it: “Being able to live to the end of a human life of nor-
mal length; not dying prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced 
as to be not worth living.”27 While it is implicit that this means gov-
ernment must provide basic necessities to secure the fulfillment of 
life so defined, for our purposes we might want to make it explicit 
that it devote enough monies that such a capacity can be attained for 
every baby born in this country. Perhaps we should prioritize fund-
ing and research dollars for these kinds of public health concerns, 
rather than approving of more research dollars for genetic selection 
and enhancements. To secure life and bodily health, as Nussbaum 
defines them, means that many more resources would be needed for 
public health care, particularly for the prenatal care for all mothers-
to-be. More would also be needed in terms of funding for disabilities 
so that disabled persons can be assured of living to the end of a hu-
                                                                                                                    
 20. Id. at 78-80. 
 21. Id. at 78. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. at 79. 
 24. Id. at 80. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Martha A. Field, Address at the Florida State University College of Law Confer-
ence on Genetics & Disability (Mar. 1, 2002). 
 27. NUSSBAUM, supra note 17, at 78. 
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man life of normal length. Of course this is just a start, and this list 
is necessarily partial. 
 Nussbaum’s theory of capabilities, with its emphasis on full per-
sonhood and human flourishing could provide a moral grounding for 
genetic interventions in assisted reproduction. Focusing on the obli-
gation of society to assist its members in realizing their capacities for 
flourishing, it would seem reasonable to discourage any practice of 
selecting out undesirable behavioral traits. Similarly, we also ought 
to discourage prenatal selection of embryos by parents-to-be who be-
lieve that the life of the future child will be perhaps more socially dif-
ficult.28 Nussbaum argues persuasively that persons living under 
disabling conditions in developing countries, for example, can attain 
to most of the capacities with sufficient social resources.29 By exten-
sion, children whose chromosomal configurations seem less than op-
timal (when viewed in the petri dish) ought to be allowed to reach 
their full capacities, however inconvenient for society. In relation to 
our topic, the capabilities theory is most helpful, I think, in providing 
us a set of standards by which society can measure itself as a wel-
coming society for people who are differently abled, or stigmatized 
with social handicaps. After all, what is so objectionable about pro-
viding persons with the resources to flourish, given the lives that are 
theirs to lead? 
 In short, I think that Nussbaum’s capabilities do provide a way to 
begin to reframe our thinking about ARTs and genetic intervention. 
Certainly, they highlight for us the crassness of a society that seeks 
the genetic quick fix, rather than the cultivation of adequate social 
resources that might foster the embrace and appreciation of all per-
sons with differences, and all differences in persons. 
IV.   PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES 
 I have hinted at some of the problems of the assisted reproduction 
industry and its relationship with genetic selection. Specifically, I lo-
cate four problems to which one solution is regulation.30 First, a per-
sonal problem. I have already alluded to a fear that I share with 
many disabled persons—the fear of elimination. Such a fear is both 
irrational in my case (we cannot select out the gene or genes for ho-
mosexuality because we do not know them, and if we did, it may 
raise more issues than it could “solve”), and such a fear is also partly 
rational: homosexuals everywhere face outright bigotry. The data 
                                                                                                                    
 28. For a related discussion, see Robert Wachbroit & David Wasserman, Patient 
Autonomy and Value-Neutrality in Nondirective Genetic Counseling, 6 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 103 (1995). 
 29. NUSSBAUM, supra note 17, at 78-80. 
 30. See supra note 7. 
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Jeffrey Botkin cites in his talk, for example, indicate the presence of 
a rational basis for fear of elimination since twenty-seven percent of 
college-age students surveyed would terminate a homosexual preg-
nancy if they had knowledge of one.31 However, since sexuality itself 
is infinitely complex and appears to be the mysterious result of envi-
ronmental and biological factors, along with free will, my fear is a 
slippery slope concern that does not itself constitute an argument. As 
with most slippery slope concerns, it constitutes a warning. 
 But second, I have a concern that the popularization of reproduc-
tive technologies through internet sites, magazines, advertisements 
and marketing encourages and magnifies “genetic ties,” to use Doro-
thy Roberts’s term32—to the exclusion of other forms of family and re-
lationship. In this sense, it fosters a culture of genetic determinism 
that is as dangerous as it is based on false assumptions about the 
significance of genes to human flourishing. It is dangerous precisely 
to the extent that it focuses our attention away from social solutions 
to solvable problems, and portrays false hopes of biological solutions 
to social issues. Violence, for instance, is surely more of a social prob-
lem than a biological one and even if it were proven to be genetically 
correlated, we could not “eliminate” the condition in eliminating 
some of the genes. (After all, we are not even able to eliminate breast 
cancer by genetic intervention, though we know of two of the genes 
for inherited breast cancer—BRCA1 and BRCA2). 
 Third, I believe that ARTs encourage the commodification of enti-
ties that are intimately connected to our sense of personhood, such as 
eggs and embryos, for example.33 Indeed, ARTs make possible, in 
both a literal and metaphorical sense, the commodification of repro-
duction. The rhetoric of commodification is carefully circumscribed in 
the assisted reproduction industry, so that no one would ever ask, 
“how much did your baby cost?” But, buying a pregnancy is actually 
what occurs in the unregulated marketplace of reproductive tech-
nologies. The question I pose sounds crass to the ears, but for those of 
us who are concerned with the reaches of new genetic technologies 
and their eugenic implications, the question of “how much did your 
baby cost?” might come to lose its crass edge as, increasingly, people 
who can afford to do so elect to give their progeny all of the advan-
tages that genetics can provide via assisted reproduction. 
 My final problem with ARTs is that they are wholly unregulated, 
a point to which I and others in this symposium have already al-
                                                                                                                    
 31. See Jeffrey Botkin, Prenatal Diagnosis and the Selection of Children, 30 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 265 (2003). 
 32. Roberts, supra note 16, at 212. 
 33. For a fuller discussion on this point, see Suzanne Holland, Contested Commodities 
at Both Ends of Life: Buying and Selling Gametes, Embryos, and Body Tissues, 11 
KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 263 (2001). 
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luded. They are almost entirely for profit, and extremely expensive. 
Thus, as currently constituted, the ARTs industry represents a chal-
lenge to the principle of justice in the following respects. Rather than 
promoting equality and nondiscrimination, a principle Martha Field 
urges on us,34 ARTs encourage a culture of discrimination and selec-
tivity; rather than being broadly accessible, they are only available to 
the elite. This poses a challenge to justice as fairness. 
 A capabilities approach, as I have argued, can provide a clear set 
of basepoints against which to measure the success or failures of any 
society with respect to fostering that Aristotelian notion of human 
flourishing. Moving toward a regulatory framework that might en-
compass some of my earlier suggestions would help bring ARTs into 
accord with the telos of society as promoting human flourishing, and 
foster the conditions by which each member can realize his or her ca-
pabilities. This telos, grounded in respect for and commitment to 
human personhood, is what anchors my suggestion for regulations on 
the kinds of choices available to those seeking medically assisted re-
production. For example, just as in this country we have actively dis-
couraged embryo selection on the basis of sex,35 so we ought openly to 
discourage embryo selection for all behavioral traits thought to put 
one at a social disadvantage. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 I have proposed that assisted reproductive services be subject to 
regulation for at least three reasons: (1) they are, in effect, dealing 
with the commodification of human entities; (2) they facilitate select-
ing out who gets to live a human life; and (3) they have a rhetorical 
association with the history of eugenics that is perpetuated by in-
creasing the options offered to couples for eugenic uses of genetic 
technologies, specifically those options that encourage selecting out 
undesirable behavioral traits and enhancing “desirable” ones. Be-
cause commitments to human personhood for society as a whole can 
be undermined by the increasing reliance on genetic technologies 
that make eugenic selection more acceptable, I believe that the bur-
den of proof for making eugenic choices in fertility clinics falls on 
those who wish to use them, rather than on those who argue against 
them. 
 Oversight and regulation will not be an easy task, and I am aware 
that the suggestion will be irksome to my libertarian critics. It is, 
                                                                                                                    
 34. Field, supra note 1, at 96-105. 
 35. In 2001, The American Society of Reproductive Medicine became the focus of con-
troversy for what appeared to be conflicting policies on the ethics of using sex selection by 
its member practitioners. For a detailed report of this conflict, see Steinbock, supra note 
12, at 24-25.  
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however, a matter for public debate and discussion, and one that we 
would do well to begin before prenatal genetic selection takes us far 
down an uncharted path where it may be difficult to use a moral 
compass to find a clear way through. 
 
